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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, S 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900393-CA 
v. t 
BARRY DUANE MORGAN, I Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of two counts of rape 
of a child, both first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-402.1 (1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 
1990), as the appeal has been transferred to this Court from the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did defendant fail to preserve certain objections 
to admission of evidence at trial; or, for the objections which 
were preserved, did the trial court abuse its discretion by 
admitting the evidence? As a general rule, appellate courts will 
not review claims of error if no contemporaneous and specific 
objection to the error was raised in the trial court. State v. 
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989). If an objection was 
raised below, a trial court ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence will not be reversed absent a demonstration that the 
trial court abused its discretion such that it created a 
likelihood of injustice. State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168, 169 
(Utah 1985). 
2. Did defendant's trial counsel provide ineffective 
assistance? This Court applies the two-prong test from State v. 
Framef 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986), in reviewing claims of 
ineffective assistance. That test is (1) whether counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and (2) whether there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's error, the result would have been 
different. State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
3. Did the trial court commit plain error when it 
admitted evidence of defendant's other bad acts? To determine if 
an error which was not objected to warrants a reversal, this 
Court must determine (1) if the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court, and (2) if the error was harmful. State v. 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 
(1989). 
4. Did defendant preserve the issue of prosecutorial 
misconduct in closing argument? Appellate courts will not review 
a claim of error regarding a prosecutor's comments in closing 
argument if no contemporaneous objection to the error was raised 
in the trial court. State v. Humphreyy 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the .'•>I di i> 
relies is included i n the body of th I s 1: »rief . 
STATEMENT OF I'HE CASE 
Defendant was charged on March 3 ^o 
counts oi- rape of a child, both first degree felonies, iii 
\ II mi i n II i mi i' in II mi in ^cord 
[hereafter i | «JI I . i , On Ma^ Bradle\ , Rich entered 
his appearance as counsel * defendant (R. 
TH f i 
chesne 
Taney, 
1989, In the Eighth Judicial District Cour 
Counts <+~- ~ - * -. ith the Honorable Dennis 
c 
the trial, the jury found defendant guilty < r .*r-r: : ;i,n! 
4o-44). 
On Novembei IJ , I • u. .. • . r 
two concurrent terms of ten years i:-- ,r ne • • ai. S4 
PI I s f I mi i i II i Il I I I in additional sentence o f * - f t e<- * • - • 
consecutively for a separate case (JR. 
November 10 ] 989, Mr. Rich filed a notice ct . . -, a-i 
c aw a 31 :: f < ,("" mi '** !l ' i| and 8f 
appointed counsel defendant appea. 
was transferred this Court by the Utah Supreme Court .« 
' ). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 






230-32). He had sole custody of his twin daughters, Machele and 
Rhonda Morgan (R. at 226). Defendant and the girls moved to 
Duchesne in April of 1986, when the girls were thirteen years of 
age (R. at 160 and 163). 
One evening in October of 1986, Machele went to 
defendant's bedroom to talk with him and found that he had been 
drinking (R. at 172). He stated that he wanted to talk to her 
about allegations that a friend of his had molested Machele 
previously (R. at 173). Defendant began to fondle Machele and 
then removed her underpants and performed sexual intercourse with 
her (R. at 173-74). Machele did not tell anyone about the abuse 
because no one had believed her when she told about the earlier 
molestation by defendant's friend (R. at 176). 
Sometime later, defendant became angry at Machele and 
Rhonda and beat them in the presence of one of their friends (R. 
at 176-77). A few days later, defendant called Machele into his 
room to talk about the beating (R. at 177). He made her 
"snuggle" up to him then began to fondle her. Eventually he 
performed sexual intercourse with her, ejaculating on her stomach 
(R. at 177-79). 
On a third occasion, defendant's girlfriend had left 
after a fight (R. at 179). Defendant wanted to talk to Machele 
about the fight; as before, defendant began fondling Machele and 
had sexual intercourse with her (R. at 179-80). She did not 
report these occurrences because she was afraid of her father's 
The trial transcript has been paginated internally, then 
stamped with record page numbers. This brief will use the record 
page numbers for transcript citations. 
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111 r H ei I | l I Mill III II in MacliHIu U'.-.l M i n i I hi- I i le l M K L I I I I i l l 'a Il' n 
lot _s.»J be. .one angry physically abusive when h*-- Jiaj4> F 
1.. ._,. 
and the twins :,ai moved into the home of . . ..-.r e^-.- XLJCJ-- she 
and defenda'+• marriec December * Oewev Arr^n^ 
c 
living .aeteen-year-old boy and fifteen-year ~ 'd 
triple4-? -**-* - - *^-rather reused 
"chao^ ..cemr>er uicneie Degan - . ing 
verbally with Vivian when Vivian accused Machele ol wanting to 
tear the famiJII ] ; apa i: I: ai 1 ::t sill e<= % \ ; :ii th I lex fc 1:1 le i: a q n i in | II" iit I (id 
a n d II 9 2 ) Ii Ihe i I Machele swore at Viviai I ii :ii vian' s fifteen-year-
old son physically attacked Machele (R. at 166, 195, and 295) 
foster care :i n Arizona (R. a !:: J Il 4 3 5) While i i I the foster 1 lome , 
Machele disclosed that her father had had sexual intercourse with 
h 
Rhonda testified that she and Machele did not 1 ike 
living in Vivian's home at 209). The final fight betw eei i 
V a i id Mac! leJII e 
learned that Vivian was trying suade Vivian's own fifteen 
year-old daughter to become pregnant by defendant to give Vivian 
a 
Defendant denied thai the abuse had ever occuried (R. 
at 239) He testified that. Machele had sent him a lettei from 
the foster home, denying the allegations, and telling h i in tha t 
she had only accused him in order to get away from the home (R. 
at 240-41). When he received the letter, defendant became angry 
and threw it away (R. at 241-43). He admitted slapping the 
girls, stating that that was appropriate discipline (R. at 228-29 
and 245). He also admitted "goosing" the girls and pinching 
their breasts; he thought that it was lf[j]ust something you do" 
(R. at 244-45). 
Vivian and her four children testified that Machele was 
a troublemaker who made up stories of abuse to get attention and 
to alienate defendant's friends (R. at 257-60, 284-85, 288-89, 
292-93, and 295-96). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's claims of error in points I, II, III, and V 
are not supported by citations to the record or by analysis of 
the applicability of the cases cited to the facts of this case. 
Consequently, this Court should decline to review the claims of 
error in those points. 
Defendant has failed to preserve certain of his 
admissibility of evidence claims for review by failing to object 
below. Of the claims which were preserved, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion by overruling the objections. Evidence 
of the fondling of the victim's sister by defendant and the 
allegations that defendant's wife had provided drugs to a minor, 
were elicited by defense counsel's questioning in the first 
instance, and their admission did not rise to the level of 
reversible error in any event. 
Defendant was not denied the effective assi stance of 
c HIM II Il i Il in I b ] e < , I. lb : • : em : t: iiiiii ::i i i, 
'.testimony, c: :: m :ii is a Il acted within his theory of the case and i n 
furtherance of hi s stated trial strategy. 
1 Eili 
evidence -x other bad acts by defendant Given, defense counsel's 
stated trial strategy, the error in admitting this other evidence 
Defendant failed object to comments made by the 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY ADMITTING CERTAIN EVIDENCE, 
As a preliminary matter, only defendant ~ fourth and 
sixth points contain - citations to the record i:. support oi 
h i) (9) , 1 J I i ill: > I Ii Ill i MIS • •  Ill: a | • • 
Procedure, provides: 
The argument [of an appellate brief] shall 
contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on,. 
This Court explained - impact of th i s r ul e i n Koulis v. 
Standard Oil Co, of Cal 2 il l 1 82 (I J I ; 
If a party fails to make a concise 
statement of the facts and citation of the 
pages in the record where those facts are 
supported, the court wil 1 assume the 
correctness of the judgment below. • . • 
"This Court need not, and will not, consider 
any facts net properly cited , or supported 
bv thp .-eccx< 
The Advisory Committee Note to Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure on Rule 24 also 
requires each party submitting a brief to set 
forth a properly documented argument: "The 
argument shall contain the contentions of the 
appellant with respect to the issues 
presented and the reasons therefor, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
parts of the record relied on." 
Rule 24(k) sets forth minimum standards of 
adequacy for arguments, and sanctions for 
failure to adhere to these standards. 
Requirements and Sanctions. . . . Briefs 
which are not in compliance may be 
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court[.] 
Id. at 1184 (quoting Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 
P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978)) (other citations omitted). Because 
defendant has failed to cite to the record to support his claims 
in points I, II, III and V, this Court should disregard those 
arguments. 
Defendant's first three claims of error involve the 
admission of evidence of acts by defendant other than two acts of 
sexual intercourse charged in the information. These three 
claims will be addressed jointly in this point. 
Addressing to the merits of defendant's claims in 
points I, II, and III, two different standards of review are 
applicable. As the record demonstrates, and defendant admits, 
some of the evidence he now challenges was not objected to at 
trial. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Johnson, 774 
P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989): 
"A general rule of appellate review in 
criminal cases in Utah is that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of 
specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record 
before an appellate court will review such 
claim on appeal." 
•8-
16. ...j orate v. Tillman t ) 
P.2d 5 46, :• (Utah 1987) Under the general rule, this Court 
shoulc • ••"* *— -ddress allegations of error which were not 
prese.i I ow u . 
Some of the evidentiary ma I ters c :>£ w! i ich defendant 
complains in the first three points : f Ji i s b c • i ef v :> 
a I i lull I! HI I I established that •• [t]he trial cour 
ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed 
absent a showing that the 5 
to create f likelihood that injustice resulted State v. 
Royball, - (Utah : - ee also State v. Gentry, 
7 . ff'vi ev shoij I ci 
be applied ,,— matters properly preserved below. 
Waiver. 
D -
improperly admitted: , Evidence that defendant "goosed" c 
pinched the breasts of, and fondled, the victim's twin sister; 
( ,.u *™r and i, fin at, 
Vivian had asked her fifteen-year- ; daughtei become pregnant 
by defendar* "idence that defendant -«--.-,--• and 
\, evidence . incident 
: rape in Duchesne, and other fondling and intercourse with t e 
victim which occurred in other states. 
Nc objection was ever raised, to the evidence that 
defendant "goosed" s~d pinched the girls (R, at 132;. ii* iaci, 
wwiendant has also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel 
for failure to object and plain erroi In admission of the 
evidence. These issues are treated In separate points., 
defendant admitted on direct examination that he did those acts; 
he claimed that they were normal, were meant in jest, and had no 
sexual connotation (R. at 244). Defendant also never objected to 
testimony that he had beaten the victim (R. at 176-77). On 
direct examination, he claimed that he had slapped the girls, not 
beaten them, and that his discipline was appropriate (R. at 228-
29 and 245). The testimony of a third incident of rape of the 
victim, of defendant "grabbing" the victim's breasts while in 
Colorado and California, and of similar sexual incidents 
occurring in South Dakota and Montana also did not elicit 
objections by defendant at trial (R. at 179, 173, and 181). None 
of these alleged errors have been preserved for appellate review 
because defendant failed to object to them below. Because the 
errors were not preserved, this Court should decline to address 
them. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989). 
B. Matters to Which Objections Were Raised. 
The remaining allegations of error in points I, II, and 
III, which were preserved for review, are that the trial court 
erroneously admitted evidence defendant fondled the victim's twin 
sister and that Vivian provided drugs to and asked her daughter 
to bear defendant's child. Defendant did object during the 
testimony of Ryan Bond in the following exchange: 
Q. (By Mr. Gillespie) [prosecutor] Did 
you — did the defendant, Mr. Morgan, make 
any statements to you regarding the 
allegations that had been made? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. What did the defendant say? 
Mr. Rich [defense counsel]: May the 
record clearify [sic] that this is an 
allegation regarding rape of the children? 
Is that the allegation that we are 
addressing? 
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Q. (By Mr. Gillespie) What were the 
allegations you were investigating at that 
time? 
A. The allegations that we were 
investigating were that Mr. Morgan had 
fondled Rhonda Morgan and had sexual 
intercourse with Machele Morgan. 
Mr. Rich; I'll object to that based on 
the fact that at least one half of that is 
irrelevant to this case, and his response to 
the allegations related to fondling Rhonda 
have nothing to do with the rape of Machele 
that is alleged in the information before the 
court here today. 
Mr. Gillespie: Your Honor[,] I would 
state that this shows a common purpose and 
scheme of a father going to be having 
intercourse with one daughterf the fact that 
he is taking inappropriate sexual moves with 
the other daughter is certainly relevant to 
that. 
The Court: Well, the objection is 
overruled. Mr. Rich in fact asked for the 
specific — asked the question about what the 
allegations were, and the witness was simply 
answering the question asked by Mr. Rich. 
Mr. Rich: Well, let me say my purpose in 
doing that was because I knew we were headed 
here, we were about to broaden the attack on 
my client in an unwarranted fashion. I 
simply raised that in advance, hoping that we 
wouldn't trod out the wide variety of 
allegations against my client where he is 
accused of only these two accounts [sic]. We 
are now in the process of smearing the 
courtroom with that, and I think that's in 
violation of Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403 
and 404. It doesn't qualify under any other 
exceptions. 
The Court: Well, the objection is 
overruled. The allegations have been stated. 
It's not to be pursued on the basis of this 
witness' knowledge any further, and the 
record is now made. 
(R. at 128-29). No further testimony was elicited from Mr. Bond 
about the allegation of defendant fondling Rhonda. 
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On appeal, defendant appears to be challenging the 
3 4 5 
admission of this testimony under rules 403, 404(b), and 801, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. While defendant cites cases regarding 
the admission of testimony of prior crimes or bad acts, he does 
not provide analysis of the applicability of the rules of 
evidence or the case law to the present case. In his brief, 
defendant states: 
The admissibility of prior bad acts 
evidence is subject to the protection of the 
Utah Rule of Evidence, Rule 403. . . . In 
this case the evidence admitted was extremely 
and unfairly prejudicial to the defendant and 
was not probative of any material fact at 
issue in the case against the defendant. 
The text of rule 403 reads: 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
4 
The text of rule 404(b) reads: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
5 
This rule contains definitions of the terms used in the 
hearsay rule. The definition of "hearsay" itself appears to be 
the portion of that rule pertinent to this appeals; it reads: 
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
Although it is not clear what defendant intended when he cited 
rule 801, he is probably referring to rule 802, the text of which 
reads: 
Hearsay is not admissible except as 
provided by law or by these rules. 
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(Brief of Appellant [hereafter Br. of App.] at 10). These 
blanket statements do not serve to provide a legal or factual 
analysis of the evidence admitted in this case. Defendant does 
not even mention rule 404(b) in the context of the admissibility 
of Mr, Bond's testimony. Because defendant fails to provide 
analysis of the applicability of the law to the facts in this 
case, this Court should decline to address this issue on appeal. 
State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) ("Rule 24(a)(9) 
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court requires that the argument 
section of a brief 'contain the contentions of the [party] with 
respect to the issues presented and the reasons therefor/ with 
citations'") (emphasis in original). 
Defendant's only reference to rule 801 is 
The evidence came in through Ryan Bond who 
testified as to what the girls had told him. 
The evidence was hearsay under Rule 801, Utah 
Rules of Evidence and was inadmissible on 
that ground. 
(Br. of App. at 12). No objection on that basis was interposed 
at trial; consequently, this Court should decline to address the 
admissibility issue on that ground. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 
656, 660 (Utah 1985) ("where a defendant fails to assert a 
particular ground for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in 
the trial court, an appellate court will not consider that ground 
on appeal"). 
The trial court did not overrule defendant's objection 
on the basis that the evidence of defendant fondling Rhonda did 
not violate the rules of evidence; it overruled the objection on 
the basis that the evidence was elicited by a request for 
-13-
clarification made by defendant's counsel. Mr. Bond was 
testifying regarding statements made to him by defendant about 
the "allegations that had been made" (R. at 128). Defense 
counsel interrupted at that point and asked for clarification 
about what allegations were being addressed. Mr. Bond responded 
that the allegations were the fondling of Rhonda and sexual 
intercourse with Machele (R. at 128). Mr. Rich objected to 
testimony about abuse of Rhonda, and, although the court 
overruled the objection, the court did order the prosecutor not 
to pursue that testimony. Mr. Bond did not testify any further 
regarding Rhonda's allegations. The purposes of defendant's 
objection were achieved, although the court overruled his 
objection. No further testimony about Rhonda's allegation was 
given until defense counsel's cross-examination of Mr. Bond. 
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Mr. Bond 
about other allegations in the following exchange: 
Q. [By Mr. Rich] You referred to some 
other allegetions [sic], and let's just take 
a second to lay those to rest as well. 
Both girls claimed that they had been 
touched by their father? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And when you confronted Barry with 
this he said — admitted that that was true, 
did he not, that he had goosed them? 
A. Right. 
Q. And that he had on occasion playfully 
touched their breasts? 
A. I believe he referred to it as 
pinching their breasts. 
Q. And it was clear from the way he told 
you about that that that to him wasn't a 
sexual item? 
A. He did not consider that inappropriate 
or sexual. 
Q. And while we may have a disagreement 
about that, certainly he never intimated that 
this was sexual conduct on his part toward 
his daughters? 
-14-
A. He didn't see it that way. 
(R. at 143-44). As will be discussed in point II, counsel's 
strategy was to minimize this evidence and attempt to turn it to 
defendant's advantage. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
admitting the testimony of Mr. Bond. "The general rule 
concerning abuse of discretion is that the appellate court 'will 
presume that the discretion of the trial court was properly 
exercised unless the record clearly shows the contrary.'" State 
v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Goddard 
v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984)). The one mention 
by Mr. Bond of Rhonda's allegation, in response to defendant's 
request for clarification, does not constitute error. It was a 
brief mention which the State did not pursue. It also was 
explained when defendant cross-examined Mr. Bond. Defendant had 
admitted to Mr. Bond that he poked the girls "in the butt" and 
pinched their breasts (R. at 143-44 and 244). Defendant did not 
consider these actions to have sexual overtones and did not 
consider them to be inappropriate behavior (R. at 143-44 and 
244). Given the explanation of that behavior elicited from Mr. 
Bond and from defendant, and given the fact that defendant had 
admitted the behavior when first questioned by Mr. Bond, 
admission of Mr. Bond's mention of Rhonda's allegation was not 
error. 
The other admissibility issue which defendant may have 
preserved for appeal is the testimony that Vivian had given drugs 
to her fifteen-year-old daughter. In his brief, defendant claims 
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error in the admission of evidence that Vivian had asked her 
daughter to bear defendant's child; however, the record shows 
that defendant never objected to admission of that portion of the 
evidence (R. at 190-91, 205, and 210). 
The first testimony about Vivian's actions came when 
defense counsel was cross-examining Machele. Mr. Rich asked 
Machele if there came a time when the arguments between Vivian's 
family and Machele "escalated" (R. at 190). Machele answered: 
A. No. It was not over that [Machele 
teaching Vivian's children how to do the 
laundry the way defendant wanted it done]. 
It was over him and Vivian and Misty. Misty 
asked — Vivian asked Misty if she would have 
their baby. 
(R. at 190). Counsel asked several more questions eliciting the 
details about Machele's knowledge of this request (R. at 191-92). 
On redirect examination, the prosecutor obtained more details 
from Machele; no objection was interposed (R. at 205). 
When the victim's sister, Rhonda, also testified 
regarding Vivian's request, the only objection interposed was a 
hearsay objection (R. at 211). However, when Rhonda went on to 
testify that Vivian had given Misty drugs, defense counsel moved 
for mistrial (R. at 211-13). The motion, heard outside of the 
presence of the jury, was that the prosecution had "elicited 
testimony of an extremely prejudicial nature unrelated to the 
events, and based on that I [Mr. Rich] think that the jury cannot 
help but be tainted and a mistrial is the only remedy" (R. at 
212). While it is not completely clear, the motion appears to 
have been addressed solely to the evidence that Vivian, an 
upcoming defense witness, had provided drugs to a juvenile (R. at 
- I f i -
212-13). The prosecutor argued that the drug evidence was no 
more prejudicial than evidence that Vivian wanted Misty to bear 
defendant's child. That evidence had come out on defendant's 
cross-examination of Machele and had not been objected to or 
stricken (R. 213-14). 
In State v. DiBello, 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1989), the 
Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar issue. The court found 
that admission of a videotape showing the decedent was error 
because its "gruesomeness" created unfair prejudice which was not 
outweighed by any probative value. However, the court determined 
that the error was harmless because defendant did not challenge, 
either at trial or on appeal, introduction of still photographs 
which showed the same gruesome scene. DiBello's failure to 
object or appeal inclusion of the still photographs "effectively 
undermined his claim that the improper introduction of the 
comparably gruesome videotape constituted harmful error." JEd. at 
1231 (citing State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 64-65 (Utah 1983)). 
Just as in DiBello, defendant did not object to the arguably more 
prejudicial testimony that defendant and his wife sought to have 
her fifteen-year-old daughter bear defendant's child. This 
failure effectively undermines defendant's claim that testimony 
that defendant's wife provided drugs to her daughter constituted 
harmful error. 
Defense counsel responded to this argument that he had 
not intended to elicit evidence about the daughter bearing 
The daughter, Misty, testified that her mother had given her 
something to calm her once when Misty was upset because Machele 
made her "nervous" (R. at 285). 
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defendant's child, and that Machele had ,fblindside[d],f him. When 
that occurred, he chose to ignore or minimize the testimony 
rather than emphasize it in the jurors' minds (R. at 214). 
The trial court determined that the statements about 
Vivian providing drugs was no "more than marginally prejudicial, 
if they are prejudicial" (R. at 215). "'[A]ppraisal of the 
probative and prejudicial value of evidence . . . is generally 
entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not 
be upset on appeal absent manifest error.'" State v. Featherson, 
781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 
981, 983 (Utah 1989)). The testimony of the victim established 
defendant's guilt of the charges; the "marginally prejudicial" 
evidence of other bad acts was not "sufficiently prejudicial that 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for . 
. . defendant in its absence." Featherson, 781 P.2d at 431. 
The jury properly performed its function in evaluating 
the testimony presented at trial and the credibility of the 
witnesses. If the trial court erred in allowing certain 
evidence, there is no reasonable probability of a different 
result, given the failure of defendant to either object at all to 
certain evidence, or to object to the introduction of evidence 
which was arguably as prejudicial as the challenged testimony. 
Therefore, the likelihood of a different result had the jury not 
heard the evidence that defendant objected to is not great. 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS AFFORDED THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Defendant next contends, in point IV of his brief, that 
his counsel provided ineffective assistance at trial. The Utah 
Supreme Court stated the standard for reviewing a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 
(Utah 1986)
 # wherein it said: 
In claiming ineffective counsel, defendant 
has the burden to demonstrate that counsel's 
representation falls below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. Codianna v. 
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1108-09 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant must prove that specific, 
identified acts or omissions fall outside the 
wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. The claim may not be 
speculative, but must be a demonstrative 
reality, sufficient to overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised "reasonable 
professional judgment." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 . . . (1984); State 
v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1204 (Utah 1984). 
And, an unfavorable result does not compel a 
conclusion of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. State v. Buel# 700 P.2d [701,] 703 
[(Utah 1985)]. 
Furthermore, any deficiency must be 
prejudicial to defendant. . . . To be found 
sufficiently prejudicial, defendant must 
affirmatively show that a "reasonable 
probability" exists that, but for counsel's 
error, the result would have been different. 
Id. at 405. As the United States Supreme Court said in 
Strickland: 
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance 
must be highly deferential. . . . [A] court 
must indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance; that 
is, the defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, 
the challenged action "might be considered 
sound trial strategy." 
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£d. at 689 (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 
"'Decisions as to . . . what objections to make . • . are 
generally left to the professional judgment of counsel.'" State 
v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) (quoting State v. 
Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah 1982)). 
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a 
conviction of two counts of sodomy of a child against a claim 
that trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to object to 
evidence of "other alleged wrongful conduct on the part of the 
defendant[.]" State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Utah 1989). 
The court said: 
However, after reviewing the record, we are 
not convinced that defendant has sufficiently 
demonstrated counsel's ineffectiveness in 
this regard. In fact, the record supports a 
determination that counsel made a conscious 
decision to allow introduction of the 
testimony in question in order to demonstrate 
[his] theory [of the case.] , . , While 
counsel conceivably took a risk by [following 
this procedure], defendant cannot now 
complain that the defense was ineffective 
because it was unsuccessful. 
Id. at 1063-64 (footnote omitted). 
The lack of objections by defendant's trial counsel 
falls within the realm of trial strategy. The material which 
defendant felt should have been objected to is listed in his 
brief at pages 19 and 20. At trial, defense counsel's theory of 
the case was that Machele and Rhonda had made up a story of abuse 
in order to be removed from defendant's custody. To this end, he 
called witnesses who testified that the girls had told them that 
that was their plan, and a witness who allegedly saw the script 
of the story (R. at 264-65, 269, 288-89, 292-93, and 295-96). 
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Given this theory, defense counsel's apparent strategy was to 
allow Machele and Rhonda latitude in developing their story so 
that the testimony would sound like a fabrication. 
Counsel also explained his strategy in the context of 
the motion for mistrial that he made during Rhonda's testimony. 
Some of the evidence which defendant now objects to came as 
volunteered testimony which defense counsel could not have 
anticipated. As counsel noted, when that occurred, his "options 
at that point [were] either leave it alone or go further out of . 
. . [his] way to remind the jury. [He chose] to leave it alone." 
(R. at 214). This strategy does not sink to the level of 
deficient performance; it is legitimate trial strategy which 
defendant now seeks to second-guess. 
Even if counsel's failure to object were to be 
considered deficient performance, the second prong of the 
Strickland-Frame test must be met. Defendant's burden is to 
"affirmatively show that a 'reasonable probability' exists that, 
but for counsel's error, the result would have been different." 
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. Defendant's brief does not even attempt 
to meet this affirmative burden. After defining "reasonable 
probability," defendant cites the evidence he now objects to, 
states that admission of the evidence was improper, and states 
that admission of the evidence "meets the two part test for 
ineffective assistance of counsel." (Br. of App. at 19-20). No 
analysis is provided to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a 
different result had trial counsel objected to all of the 
evidence defendant cites. See State v. Montes# No. 890336-CA, 
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slip op. at 4-5 (Utah Ct. App. Jan. 8, 1991) (defendant offered 
no analysis or explanation as to how counsel's actions affected 
the outcome of trial; court did not need to reach issue of 
deficient performance). Because defendant has not demonstrated 
to this Court how his trial counsel's failure to object raised a 
reasonable probability of a different result in his trial, 
defendant has not met the second prong of the Frame test. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR BY 
ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS BY 
DEFENDANT. 
Again without record citations or analysis of the 
applicability of case law to the argument, defendant claims that 
the trial court committed plain error in the admission of 
evidence. The standard for determining plain error is found in 
State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 
(1989): 
The first requirement for a finding of plain 
error is that the error be "plain," i.e., 
from our examination of the record, we must 
be able to say that it should have been 
obvious to a trial court that it was 
committing error. . . . The second and 
somewhat interrelated requirement for a 
finding of plain error is that the error 
affect the substantial rights of the accused, 
i.e., that the error be harmful. 
773 P.2d at 35 (citations and footnote omitted). 
As in his earlier claims, defendant does not analyze 
how the alleged errors were obvious to the trial court, or how 
their admission was harmful. Defendant relies on the conclusory 
assertions that 
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the instant case presents a situation where a 
high degree of harmfulness exists which would 
justify a waiver of the obviousness 
requirement. 
In this case[,] the evidence of 
defendant's improper • . . conduct • . . was 
certainly harmful to the defendant and 
affected substantial rights of the defendant. 
(Br. of App. at 22). Because defendant has failed to analyze and 
provide record citations for his claim/ this Court should decline 
to review the issue. State v. Wareham# 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 
1989). 
Addressing the merits of the claim, defendant has not 
met the requirements of the plain error test. Even if some of 
the evidence defendant now complains of may have been 
objectionable and possibly obvious to the trial court, the court 
was also aware of defense counsel's intention to avoid 
emphasizing unexpected testimony by objecting and moving to 
strike the evidence. Instead, counsel used the witnesses to 
explain and minimize defendant's conduct with Rhonda. Counsel 
also allowed testimony of other actions by defendant to support 
his theory that Machele and Rhonda had fabricated their stories 
in order to be removed from defendant's custody. Since the court 
could perceive this trial strategy, it was not obvious to the 
trial court that defense counsel was creating error by deciding 
not to object to certain evidence. 
POINT IV 
REMARKS BY THE PROSECUTOR IN CLOSING ARGUMENT 
ARE NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Defendant's final contention is that the prosecutor 
committed reversible error in closing argument when he "expressed 
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a personal opinion as to the credibility of some of the witnesses 
called on behalf of the defendant." (Br. of App. at 22). 
In this claim as well, defendant is required to have 
preserved the matter for review. A failure to object to comments 
made by the prosecutor in closing argument waives the issue for 
appellate review. State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990); see also State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 
1982). The record demonstrates that no objections were raised to 
the two statements in closing argument that defendant now 
challenges (R. at 317 and 318). Because defendant failed to 
object to the statements, this Court should decline to review the 
issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 
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